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Reverse Engineering and Emotional Attachments as 
Mechanisms Mediating the Effects of Quantification 
Wendy Espeland ∗ 
Abstract: »Reverse Engineering und emotionale Bindungen als Mechanismen, 
die die Effekte der Quantifizierung vermitteln«. Alain Desrosières understood 
statistics as simultaneous representations of the world and interventions in it. 
This article examines two mechanisms that mediate how numbers do both. The 
first, reverse engineering, describes how working backwards from a desired 
number shapes organizational routines. The second, emotional attachment, de-
scribes the processes by which numbers generate a variety of emotions that 
sometimes stimulate collective identities. Focusing on educational rankings but 
including examples of other types of numbers, it argues for the importance of 
disclosing the effects of specific causal mechanisms in the analysis of particular 
performance measures. 
Keywords: Quantification, reverse engineering, emotional attachments, causal 
mechanisms, Alain Desrosières, rankings. 
1.  Introduction 
Alain Desrosières taught us how important it is to understand numbers as rep-
resentations and interventions (Desrosières 2010, 2014; Didier 2016, in this 
HSR Special Issue). At the same time, numbers signify and change. This in-
sight is central in an outpouring of scholarship in fields ranging from anthro-
pology to accounting, much of it informed by his pioneering work. I wish to 
describe here two broad mechanisms and describe some of the interactions 
between them in how the impact of numbers as representations intervene in 
people’s interpretations and the places to which they are applied. The first 
mechanism, reverse engineering, is strategic; the second mechanism, emotional 
attachment, is not. These two mechanisms describe both causes and patterns of 
change that numbers induce in a wide array of contexts and they produce 
changes in individuals, organizations and organizational fields in which they 
are introduced. Relying extensively on an extended case study of media rank-
ings of education, work done jointly with the sociologist Michael Sauder, I 
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want to explain these mechanisms and suggest why they would be useful in the 
analysis of other kinds of quantification.1 
2.  Reverse Engineering as a Rankings Mechanism 
Most definitions of reverse engineering emphasize the process of working 
backwards from an object in order to understand how something works. Legal 
scholars Samelson and Scotchmer (2002, 1577) define reverse engineering as 
“the process of extracting know-how or knowledge from a human-made arti-
fact.” No doubt the practice is an old one – an experienced cook can recon-
struct a recipe from careful tasting, just as a good tailor can replicate an article 
of clothing with close examination – but according to the Oxford English Dic-
tionary the term’s origins were from the Cold War, with the first published 
record appearing first in 1957 hearings before the U.S. Senate Select Commit-
tee on Small Business in discussions about military procurement. 
Now widely understood as a standard logic of investigation, the term has 
expanded beyond its origins in manufacturing and engineering to describe 
styles of inquiry or innovation in many fields. In genetics, scientists speak of 
reverse engineering genes; property law is filled with examples, most of which 
are lawful because reverse engineering is labor intensive in a way that mere 
copying is not (excepting a few instances in intellectual property). Network 
scholars have argued that reverse engineering is a helpful strategy for under-
standing network structures in both social and natural scientific fields, arguing 
that it helps to close the bedeviling gap between describing networks and ex-
plaining why they emerge and how they function (Alderson 2008). Currently, 
the most conspicuous use of reverse engineering is in computer programming 
where it describes widespread practices of decomposing code to debug it, copy 
it, or improve on it. Its cachet is conveyed in the idea that learning by emulat-
ing successful companies, hence the rather breathless title of a recent book 
What would Google do? Reverse-engineering the fastest growing company in 
the history of the world (Jarvis 2011). 
Reverse engineering describes an almost universally deployed tactic law 
schools use to improve their rankings. By deconstructing their rank into its 
component parts, schools decide which factors they believe are most amenable 
to their control and develop strategies to improve those factors. Some common 
examples of reverse engineering strategies include the careful parsing of test 
scores and grade averages to create “target” numbers and devising an admis-
sion “formula” for improving these selectivity factors; less directly observable 
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but also widespread is the practice of marketing faculty accomplishments to 
improve scores on reputational surveys. Many schools also cultivate a robust 
“transfer” market in second year students as a way to improve their selectivity 
statistics since their grades or test scores do not count for rankings purposes. 
There are many other examples of gaming rankings, not only among law 
schools but by universities and graduate programs worldwide. 
Reverse engineering encourages two widespread practices: keeping careful 
track of all the elements of rankings statistics and using them to project future 
rankings, and learning as much as one can about how U.S. News and World 
Reports [hereafter USN], the dominant university ranker in the U.S., calculates 
rankings. To do the former, schools invest in elaborate record keeping and 
statistical analysis of their data, something rankings encourage whether or not 
reverse engineering is an explicit tactic. Nearly every administrator we spoke 
with described how such demands have increased as a result of rankings. Many 
schools have either university or law school institutional research departments 
whose job it is to create and sometimes massage the requisite statistics. 
There have been educational rankings for over a century but these early 
rankings were episodic exercises in evaluation that were intended for insiders, 
for educators. Educational rankings produced by media were first introduced in 
France in the 1970s but it was not until the 1980s that media rankings took off.2 
The catalyst this time was a new editor at an American weekly news magazine, 
USN created its first annual university rankings in 1988. Then a mediocre 
weekly news magazine, editors decided to rejuvenate its brand based on the 
slogan, “news you can use,” in order to distinguish it from the far more promi-
nent Time and Newsweek magazines. As part of this consumer-oriented fram-
ing, USN saw its university rankings as providing useful consumer information 
to help potential students and their parents in order to help with the often over-
whelming decisions of where to apply and attend college. The magazine’s 
motives did not include any effort to “improve” education or hold educators 
more “accountable.” These “services” provided by rankings only emerged 
years later as rankings acquired new uses for new audiences. In this, rankings 
differ from other performance measures that are intended to encourage people 
to improve their performance. In Alain Desrosières’ terms, the rankings were 
originally intended as descriptive measures but given the attention they re-
ceived they quickly became prescriptive (Desrosières 2010, 1-6). As he points 
out, the tension in these two contradictory uses of statistics is a prominent 
feature of quantitative information. 
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USN expanded its wildly successful annual university rankings to include 
graduate schools in 1990. For law schools, the organizations we studied most 
intensively, USN uses four indicators: reputation, 40% of the overall score, is 
determined by two surveys sent to faculty and practitioners; selectivity, 25%, is 
based on first year students’ grade averages from their undergraduate universi-
ty, standardized test scores from the required admissions test, and the percent 
of applicants who were admitted; placement success, 20%, is based on the 
percent of students employed at graduation, nine months after graduation, and 
the bar passage rate; faculty resources, 15%, is composed of four separate 
measures: expenditure rate per student (for instruction, library, and supporting 
services), student-faculty ratio, “other” per-student spending (primarily finan-
cial aid), and volumes in library. To compute the final ranking, each school’s 
score is standardized. These scores are then weighted, totaled, and rescaled so 
that the top school receives a score of 100 and other schools receive a percent-
age of the top score. It is important to point out that while USN consulted edu-
cators, rankings were created by staff with no training in methods, statistics, or 
education. USN initially did not provide much information about how it com-
puted its rankings but over time, due to pressure from educators, it included 
more information. 
To learn more about how USN calculates rankings, schools scrutinize its 
published methodology, follow its social media, which is where changes in 
measures are usually announced, and monitor ranking stories in a wide array of 
media, including the many blogs on rankings written by law professors, jour-
nalists and others. Colleagues exploit professional networks, both formal and 
informal, for information and gossip. Tips for manipulating rankings are often 
carefully guarded secrets passed on only to trustworthy friends. On multiple 
occasions interviews we were asked to not reveal what many considered “trade 
secrets” for managing the numbers; nearly as often, we were asked for “insid-
er” information about USN’s methods. Schools also “learn” from past experi-
ence, accumulating techniques and for manipulating rankings, not all of which 
are demonstrably effective. Several times we have been contacted by adminis-
trators hoping to learn more about how some component is constructed. Robert 
Morse, the director of rankings, reports that he hears from many schools eager 
to learn more about how rankings are calculated or offering advice about how 
USN “improves” rankings. 
It is important to examine the reasons why so many schools resort to manip-
ulating ranking indicators rather than engage in more sincere efforts to improve 
their performance. There are a number of factors that contribute to “gaming” 
statistics. First, with rankings, most people believe they are not legitimate 
measures of performance. USN methods for producing rankings have been 
widely denounced by experts and the media. For example, the rankings leave 
out important educational criteria such as quality of teaching or even the goals 
of particular schools. The internal validity of the measures are dubious at best. 
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Does the money spent on library books affect the quality of education? Moreo-
ver, the scores of schools are tightly bunched together, even tiny changes in 
measures can produce dramatic shifts in outcomes. Rankings flunk all sensitivi-
ty tests that try to establish the robustness of a measure. Educators resent the 
influence of these poor measures. 
More importantly, and more relevant to other kinds of performance 
measures, is that the gap between the number and that which the number pur-
ports to measure is so great it is far easier to manipulate a number than to try to 
change the characteristics that is supposed to be measured. A school’s reputa-
tion is an important feature of the benefits it confers on its students. But reputa-
tion is a nebulous quality that changes only slowly over time. It is much easier 
to try to change reputation by gaming survey results, e.g. collecting surveys 
sent one’s school and filling them out in tandem in order to maximize one’s 
standing in relation to schools with rankings close to one’s school, than it is to 
change one’s reputation. For factors, such as selectivity, which are easier to 
control, schools do treat the measure quite literally. 
They change admissions procedures to produce higher selectivity numbers 
by encouraging applicants they reject, admit students with higher test scores 
and offer them scholarship money, and so on. The larger question of whether 
these are the best students to admit is one that is pushed aside. 
Finally, another reason why so many schools and likely so many others 
whose performance is measured resort to manipulation is the temporal dimen-
sions of these measures. Most measures, like rankings, are produced annually 
which strongly encourages a short-term orientation. People are forced to care 
about the numbers this year when the goals behind the numbers are often com-
plex and would take longer to address. Long-range strategy becomes a luxury 
in the realm of short-term measures. 
While each performance measure will have particular effects on those it 
governs, if the rewards and punishments attached to the measure are important, 
if the measures are publicized, if the gap between the measure and the goal is 
great, or if it is extremely difficult to accomplish the goal behind the measure, 
the temptation will be to manipulate the number. Conversely, if the measures 
are seen as legitimate, if managers are given ample time to implement new 
policies, if efforts are rewarded as well as outcomes, we would expect less 
gaming and more efforts to change the substantive goals behind the measures. 
“Reverse engineering” is a fruitful way to conceptualize the motives for 
rankings manipulations, first, because it is such a common strategy, one that 
members often use to name a bundle of practices used to make sense of and 
manage rankings. The people we interviewed routinely described what they did 
either explicitly or implicitly as “reverse engineering” and some reported that it 
is a helpful tool in explaining their rankings to various audiences or overseers. 
Reverse engineering is simultaneously a way to know something (how rankings 
work), a way to do something (manufacture the number you want), and a way 
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of checking something (are our plans working? are people doing their jobs 
properly?). 
Conceiving of reverse engineering as a mechanism of change is helpful for 
several reasons. First, it allows scholars to connect this practice with other 
related strategic social processes such as creating “audit trails,” which make it 
possible to trace backwards the calculations performed, “transparency,” “ac-
countability,” or “reproducibility.” It also encourages intellectual engagement 
with the broadly relevant literatures on auditing (Power 1994, 1997), risk as-
sessment (MacKenzie 1993; Hutter 2000; Hutter and Power 2005; Power 
2007), performance evaluation, strategic management and balanced scorecards 
(Johnson and Kaplan 1987; Kaplan and Norton 1996) and governmentality 
(Foucault 2007; Miller and O’Learly 1987; Rose and Miller 2008; Mennicken 
and Miller 2012). Moreover, reverse engineering is closely related to how 
others, including many of our respondents, talk about such practices. Reverse 
engineering can also be deployed as a “check” on the calculations or, more 
broadly, the methods of others – a form of doing and communicating and creat-
ing “reliability” or whatever notion of scientific respectability you desire, or for 
debunking, debasing the same. 
It is useful to unpack some of the dimensions of reverse engineering to re-
veal how this form of thinking and action shapes organizational members’ 
understanding of rankings. Deconstruction is the primary cognitive practice 
associated with reverse engineering and it is built on the assumption that some-
thing can be known if it is taken apart, if we somehow reduce to its parts. This 
is a sensible approach to understanding end-products but one that depends on 
other largely implicit assumptions. First, in many cases, it is extremely difficult 
to reverse engineer something, especially if crucial information is missing, 
which is typically the case. Although calculation is considered one of the most 
transparent and therefore reproducible forms of knowledge, scrutinizing pro-
prietary algorithms is hardly easy. The classifications that create the definitions 
that are used to construct measures create a complex cognitive infrastructure 
for rankings, one that undergirds all measure but is often obscure to those who 
make and use rankings. This infrastructure is made, rather than given, and rests 
on the fundamental idea that the equivalences that rankings produce – within 
and between schools – are social conventions rather than relations exterior to 
measurement. They are created rather than given, and reflexive in ways that 
shapes the categories through which we understand ourselves as members of 
groups or as individuals. Desrosières calls this process a “convention of equiva-
lences.” Understanding calculation this way opens up measures to sociological 
analysis. Alain Desrosières was one of the central figures in elaborating this 
way of thinking about statistics and INSEE (the French National Institute of 
Statistics and Economic Research) was one of the central locations for this 
work. Other important researchers associated with the economics of convention 
are Laurent Thévenot, Robert Salais, François Eymard-Duvernay, Olivier Fa-
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vereau, André Orléan, and Luc Boltanski.3 The production of equivalence, at its 
most general, is the assumption that all universities are somehow the same and 
have the same goals. More concretely, the dimensions that rankings are intend-
ed to measure are made equivalent with one another so that one can easily 
compare the performances of people in different parts of the university; for 
example, one can “see” how well admissions staff are doing in comparison to 
career services staff by looking at their relative contributions to the rankings 
and comparing their performance over time. 
Initially, USN did not provide much detailed information about its methods, 
something that came up often in criticisms. It reported the categories and 
weights assigned them in its methods but this left many unknowns. For exam-
ple, for years USN did not disclose how its reputational surveys, a factor that 
determine 40% of a school’s score and is the most heavily weighted component 
of rankings, were conducted or how many people responded to it. Only later 
did schools learn that a consulting company was hired to write and administer 
the surveys of both practitioners and law school members, that the response 
rate was very low, especially that for the practitioners, that within law schools 
four people were surveyed, the dean, dean of academic affairs, chair of ap-
pointments committee, and last tenured professor. But USN has never revealed 
how its sample is drawn and what are the biases of this likely non-random 
sample. Even today, one of the biggest mysteries surrounding the rankings is 
how respondents in the practitioner survey are selected. 
Providing details about methods is a crucial part of producing “valid” social 
knowledge; however, as the extent of gaming became more known and threat-
ening to undermine (further) the credibility of USN rankings, USN reversed its 
pattern of increasing disclosure in order impede gaming. It was common prac-
tice for schools to “improve” their placement numbers by counting any job, 
even the most menial, as a “placement,” hiring their own unemployed students 
until the numbers were reported, and even paying firms to hire their unem-
ployed students. When during the Great Recession, angry unemployed students 
started challenging schools’ glowing job statistics, including filing law suits 
against them, when members of Congress began to threaten to regulate the 
reporting of job statistics, the American Bar Association, the accrediting agen-
cy for American law schools and USN began to require more nuanced em-
ployment statistics, including whether reported jobs required an law degree, 
were part-time or temporary, or were at a graduate’s law school. In compiling 
the overall placement statistic used in its rankings, USN announced it would no 
longer provide all the weights to the various sub-factors as a way to deter gam-
ing. Consequently, even though reverse engineering might seem an obvious 
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strategy of management, it is not as easy to accomplish as it might seem at first, 
despite claims to transparency and rigorous methods. 
Sequencing is another key feature of reverse engineering. The end product, 
the ranking, is a summary statement of worth or merit but in order to decon-
struct this summary there are multiple intermediate processes that pertain to 
particular variables. The presumption underneath reverse engineering is the 
salience of the logical connections that create its integration; put differently, the 
ranking is a sturdy object that must be worked on in order to reveal itself, and 
that its ultimate commensuration or integration is a logical sequential connec-
tion rather than the arbitrarily accumulated and weighted parts that it is. An 
orientation to reverse engineering, in other words, encourages logical connec-
tions that are not necessarily there. In contrast to the reverse engineering of 
computer code or manufactured parts, the connections among rankings are 
more arbitrary. 
Part of the sequential orientation of reverse engineering is a particular cogni-
tive and temporal orientation toward its objects: one thinks backwards from the 
present in order to project forwards into the future. But this is not as one-
directional as it might seem; the backwards and forwards of deconstructing 
rankings is more of a dialectical process for organizations as adjustments to 
organizational routines are often more continuous than a strict before and after 
approach to this disassembling. Whereas the motivation for much reverse engi-
neering is innovation and improvement in the object under scrutiny, as well as 
copying something but with ranking these motives are irrelevant as schools 
have no control over the ultimate object, other than persuasion. For example, 
some schools may work on decomposing only one rankings factor, while others 
might work on multiple factors. Schools may abruptly change course as they 
learn more about factors (e.g. promotional material has little apparent effect), 
or as other schools adopt strategies that they feel they must also adopt, or as 
new information is revealed or changes made by USN. 
Perhaps the most salient consequence of reverse engineering to encourage 
an already prevalent attitude of focusing on the number rather than what the 
number is supposed to measure. One school had the unhappy experience of 
falling out of the first tier (top 50 schools). When asked if they were strategiz-
ing about how move back into the top tier, the dean said: “Oh, absolutely. 
Absolutely. We’ve done a lot of careful studying of the USN methodology to 
figure out what counts the most and what is perhaps the most manipulable, 
because those are not necessarily the same things.” 
One law professor we interviewed described how at the retirement part of a 
retiring dean, he was presented with a crystal numbers that commemorated the 
schools rise in the rankings one place, as if this were his greatest accomplish-
ment as dean. 
We can find many examples of reverse engineering in the scholarly litera-
ture on performance rankings. From civil engineers who invented elaborate 
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benefits while ignoring obvious costs for their projects in order to produce 
positive cost-benefit analysis (Porter 1995; Espeland 1998), to New York sur-
geons who refuse to operate on risky cases in order to boost their scores on state-
mandated “report cards” (Narins et al. 2005), to accountants at Ernst & Young 
who approved the practice of “Repo 105” in which Lehman Brothers investment 
bank bought back shares of its debt and reported these as sales in order to appear 
less leveraged that it was shortly before its collapse during the Great Recession 
(Jauhar 2015; Reed 2010), whenever there are fateful, public numbers in play, 
the temptation to produce positive numbers will be pronounced. 
In sum, reverse engineering is a broadly adapted strategy that encourages an 
orientation toward rankings that strongly influences how schools respond to 
rankings, how they understand them as kinds of measures, and their legitimacy 
as such. As forms of “scientific” knowledge the publishing of methodology is 
an important part of what the magazine and some consumers see as the validity 
or respectability of rankings. Yet, the requisite public rendering of methods at 
the same times makes them more vulnerable to gaming, which undermines 
their legitimacy. This tension between publicly producing methods and data, a 
fundamental feature of scientific accountability and the manipulation of num-
bers to produce better looking results, is why many performance metrics pro-
vide a very tenuous and selective accountability. Many people know this but 
this seems to do little to dampen their power. 
3.  Emotional Attachment to Numbers 
As Emile Durkheim has famously argued in The elementary forms of religious 
life (Durkheim 1995), the more abstract the relationship, the harder it is for 
people to invest it with emotion. That is why he believed it was so necessary 
for people to use symbols and rituals to produce the proper intense emotional 
attachments to society such that we are willing to sacrifice individual goals and 
interests to the needs of the collectivity. While they may seem less evocative 
than a totem or a flag, numbers can also become powerful symbols of belong-
ing, identity, and status. Sometimes we become invested in a particular number 
or set of numbers: being “number one” or in the “top ten” appeals to many 
sports fans, students, and educators. 
Scholars have mostly neglected people’s emotional attachments to numbers, 
this despite their importance for the founders of the discipline of sociology. 
Marx wrote about the distinctive alienation associated with capitalism. Anomie 
was fundamental to Durkheim’s modernism and he believed that “collective 
effervescence, the powerful emotional attachments forged through ritual,” is 
crucial for our attachments to groups that is the antidote to anomie. For Weber, 
the capacity of rationalization to drain from life its meaning was crucial for 
understand the stakes of modernity, and while calculation was crucial for capi-
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talism to develop, it contributes to the flattening of our emotional lives. And 
Simmel described cynicism and apathy as responses to the pace of modern life 
and the effects of a money economy. Nevertheless, these early investigations of 
emotional responses to broad changes in economic and political life were sel-
dom emulated by more contemporary scholars, at least as systematically as in 
these classical accounts. This “prolonged marginalization of emotion,” as Von 
Scheve (2013) terms it, lasted some sixty years. It was only in the 1980s due to, 
in part, the pioneering work of Arlie Hochschild, that the sociology of emotions 
became a legitimate sub-field in North American sociology.4 Hochschild 
(1983) analyzed the emotional labor demanded and produced in service occu-
pations and at home (Hochschild 1989); Robin Leidner investigates the emo-
tional labor in the fast food industry, while Jennifer Piece analyzes it in law 
firms; Jim Jaspers (1997) and other social movement scholars (Goodwin, Jas-
pers and Polenta 2001) see emotions as central to social movements; and schol-
ars such as Wharton (2009), Stevens (2009), and Hallett (2010) attend to the 
crucial role that emotions play in business and educational organizations. Un-
derstanding the production of emotions is now an important part of many fields 
within sociology. Key to most sociological analyses is conceiving of emotions 
as dynamic and relational, and therefore fundamental social and transactional, 
the subject of negotiation, interpretation, and suppression. As such, emotions 
cannot be understood as the product of individuated selves. 
One important facet of contemporary social life is that we are increasingly 
governed by numbers and so it is important to understand how numbers shape 
our emotions.5 Here I follow Randal Collins’ (2004) prescriptions by first un-
derstanding emotion as a primary driver of most interaction and, second, focus-
ing on the situation as the unit of analysis rather than the individual. The situa-
tions that matter most in this analysis are those that are shaped by rankings. 
And, as Sara Ahmed (2004) as argued, emotions are dynamic, increasing or 
decreasing in interaction and that emotions often become stronger and more 
salient as they circulate among actors. 
When we speak about numbers we often use the language of social distance. 
Numbers are abstract, hard, devoid of passion, cold or even heartless. Numbers 
allow us to create knowledge without the distortions of politics or feelings; they 
are impersonal, such that we sometimes describe assaults on personhood as 
someone being “reduced to numbers.” This way of thinking about numbers is 
also, of course, crucial for their usefulness and their power. Abstraction, be-
cause it strips away so much of the local and specific, makes it easy for num-
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Rottenburg et al. (2015), and Merry et al. (2015). 
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bers to travel, to be put to new uses, to be inserted into new places. Numbers 
are also supposed to be bland and boring but as the historian, Theodore Porter 
(1995) has suggested, that is also part of their power. 
As Lorraine Daston (1992) might put it, numbers help to produce “aperspec-
tival objectivity”– a “view from nowhere,” where the places and persons are 
extracted from their use (see also Daston and Galison 2007). Numbers also 
permit “mechanical objectivity,” a set of rules about how to make and deploy 
numbers that contains the discretion and biases of those using them. Mechani-
cal objectivity is especially welcome when there is conflict, mistrust, or social 
or cultural differences, conditions that make it hard to trust those charged with 
making decisions, or when decisions must be justified to others (Porter 1995). 
But despite their capacity for producing distance some numbers become obses-
sive objects of intense identification and internalization. Some produce emo-
tions that run the gamut from pride to revulsion. Some become the embodiment 
of aspirations or a shorthand for identities. And just how numbers do this is 
worth exploring. 
Educational rankings are one example of quantification that produces pow-
erful emotional responses. As a relatively recent innovation, it is possible to 
trace their trajectory from what many saw as a silly novelty to a device that 
reorganized the status system of higher education. I begin my discussion of the 
emotional consequences of rankings with a brief taxonomy of some of the most 
prevalent emotions that rankings generate. After that, I suggest of the processes 
that provoke and direct these emotions and provide examples of reverse engi-
neering and emotional attachment for other performance measures. 
When USN rankings first appeared, a few deans, including those at Harvard 
and Yale, denounced them but they were ignored by most law schools. It was 
not until administrators realized that prospective students were using them that 
they began to take them seriously. Media reported how local law schools were 
doing and this increased pressure on deans to focus on rankings. The release of 
rankings in March became a predictable annual story about whether regional 
law schools were moving up or down and they compared with each other. For 
example, one headline in Chicago Magazine (October 23, 2013) declared: 
“Does University of Chicago’s slip in the rankings matter?” 
Before long, current law students would anxiously monitor their school’s 
ranking, concerned for the effect it would have on their job prospects. One 
administrator described reactions at his school this way: “The students will get 
very upset. I’ll get letters and comments from students, ‘Man we dropped from 
30 to 35th. Can you believe it?” 
Another dean described his experience as: 
[The reaction to rankings] was primarily student-driven. The student body 
took a very aggressive stance with the dean and said there is absolutely no 
reason why we should suffer in our job prospects and salary outlooks because 
of this phenomenon, and we want you to do something about it. So she invest-
ed in areas where the school would tend to get points. 
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If rankings were popular with prospective students and local media, they were 
widely loathed by professionals in legal education. It is not hard to understand 
why. Created by journalists at a for-profit magazine with no experience in 
survey research, statistics or education, rankings were viewed as misleading 
information that threatened the authority of specialists. Administrators and 
faculty became angry at what seem like an affront to their expertise and their 
status, and a danger to legal education. Administrators and faculty described 
rankings as “oppressive,” “loathsome,” as an “assault.” One dean likened them 
to a cockroach. They reported “hating” the rankings and “resenting” time spent 
on them. A dean who had worked four law schools described the effects of 
rankings this way: 
I never thought about [rankings] except to think about how silly they were, 
when I was a faculty member [...] And it was really only when I became a 
dean that I started to think about their extraordinarily perverse effects on the 
decisions that get made in institutions, and also to appreciate what a brilliant 
public relations scam has been pulled by the editors of USN. One of the re-
markable scams of the 21st century and how they’ve pulled the wool over the 
eyes of the corporate-academic world is to their credit. 
3.1  Anxiety 
Anxiety is the most widespread emotion generated by rankings. Over and over, 
everyone from students to deans reported how anxious they were that their 
school might drop in the rankings. One experienced dean of admissions re-
members the first time he became aware of the power of rankings. He was at a 
forum for prospective students when a colleague at the next table rushed out to 
buy the latest edition of the rankings “and was shocked to find that his [top-ten] 
school had slipped [three spots] and was frankly worried for his job. And I was 
absolutely baffled at this phenomenon.” One dean reported: 
The tiers can be devastating. As you know we’ve been fortunate enough to be 
in the second tier, but every year we live in fear because to fall again is proba-
bly going to hurt contributions, is going to hurt relationship with faculty, with 
prospective students. 
Other deans offered similar responses: 
You know it’s not so much pressure to move up as it is a negative impact if 
you should move down. Somebody told me about a school that I actually 
know a lot about which is a school in the top – probably the top ten [...] And 
they experienced a drop of two positions and the Dean really kind of went into 
overdrive to send out letters to alumni and in their alumni magazine to make a 
very elaborate explanation of that. And you say, ‘Why would anybody care?’ 
It doesn’t mean a thing. It’s just one of those minor statistical variations that is 
always going to occur from time to time. But that sort of tiny little change was 
seen as very threatening to the school and really required some sort of emer-
gency program to combat. That’s a little nonsensical. 
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So the effects were sort of immediate hysteria. So I had alumni writing me left 
and right, I had my board of directors asking me what had suddenly happened 
that [...] it was an irrational response because the people writing mostly actual-
ly knew about the school. I had my student body protesting, and they’re here 
and they know in the course of one year that nothing had happened. But they 
all essentially were saying, ‘What did you do?’ So I had to spend a lot of time 
answering questions and calming people down, and that’s a waste of time. 
It is not hard to understand why rankings make people anxious. They offer a 
precise and public comparison of one’s school to every other school. They are 
extremely portable and circulate at impressive speed on the internet and in print 
media. They are tightly bunched such that only very small differences separate 
many schools; it is not unusual for six or seven schools to tie for the same 
position. In the 2016 edition, for example, 4 schools tied for 22th and 6 schools 
tied for 34th and 87th.6 When annual rankings are published, rankings of near-
by schools are widely reported in local media and in online forums. Blogs 
devoted to law or legal education meticulously deconstruct changes in rank. 
Most importantly for their impact, rankings are relative, a zero-sum affair. 
The rise of one school can mean that many schools can drop, depending on 
their location. Moreover, the force of rankings became magnified as new 
groups began to use them for new purposes; so, for example, as when some law 
firms started to incorporate rankings into their hiring criteria and central admin-
istrators started using them to evaluate deans or to make decisions about where 
to distribute resources. 
Research shows that stress levels at work are mediated by whether or not 
people feel they have control over their work (Sauder and Espeland 2009; Bond 
and Bunce 2001). The most stressful situations are those in which workers are 
accountable for outcomes but without having the resources or discretion to 
shape outcomes in significant ways. This stress and lack of control manifests 
itself in various ways. As Robert Merton (1957, 195-206) pointed out, those 
without much power become hyper vigilant over that which they do control and 
this often takes the form of meticulously enforcing rules, even if doing so is 
counter-productive. Anxiety is a predictable byproduct of accountability with-
out control. 
Each of these features of rankings – clarity, visibility, lack of control, 
speedy discrimination, finger-pointing – are elicited by the intense competition 
that rankings generate. 
                                                             
11  This is the 2016 edition, published in 2015, based on data from 2014 found at: <http:// 
www.usnews.com/education>. 
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3.2  Resentment, Frustration, and Anger 
Because rankings are seen as a coercive intrusion promulgated by unqualified 
third parties, they generate outrage as well as anxiety. Administrators repeated-
ly complained about the time they spent preparing information for USN, which 
they see as subsidizing a for-profit enterprise They complained about having 
their lives governed by journalists. They complained about the bad behavior of 
colleagues in manipulating rankings. And they complained about feeling impo-
tent in their efforts to curtail the effects of rankings. Two deans described their 
reactions this way: 
We didn’t even care, but we didn’t want to be hurt with such a bizarre [...] for 
such a bizarre reason. If we were going to be hurt, we wanted to deserve it. 
Like we have a shitty faculty, we have a 42,000 to 1 student-faculty ratio. You 
know, something […] we wanted to deserve it and we knew we didn’t. 
I wish Al Queda would make USN their next target. When sitting in people’s 
offices watching them talk about rankings it was hard to miss the passion. 
3.3  Embarrassment and Shame 
Irving Goffman (1967, 105) describes embarrassment as having “to do with 
unfulfilled expectations.” Participants have a sense of their identities and what 
is appropriate behavior in a given context and when these do not align, they are 
embarrassed. When people’s identities and their sense of what is appropriate 
behavior for the context do not align, they are embarrassed. Katz (1999, 15) 
describes shame as “impotence to organize conventional behavior.” Many of 
those interviewed for this project were embarrassed by how much time and 
attention they paid to rankings. While they did not often say this directly, their 
discomfort was expressed in avoiding eye contact, and their gestures and tone 
of voice when they talked about how much rankings mattered in their work 
routines. People said things like ‘I can’t believe how much time I spend on 
them’ or ‘I should be spending my time on things that matter,’ Beneath this 
embarrassment, I believe, is a generalized sense of impotence, of having to 
compromise professional values for inappropriate or even harmful policy. 
Catering to rankings is professionally demeaning because it means being com-
plicit in harming rather than improving legal education and the legal profes-
sion. One former dean expressed it this way: 
I think [rankings] have turned educational institutions, not all of them, thank 
God, but it’s turned many educational institutions to gamesmanship, and a 
feeling that there’s a winner and a loser. For God’s sake, we’re about educat-
ing students. You know, I spent twelve years of my life with the daughters of 
policemen, firemen, and sanitation workers […]. It’s about vocation, right? 
And the rankings change it from a vocation and encourage a ‘race to the bot-
tom’ in turns of manipulation. And that’s getting to the essence of professional 
life that I won’t compromise. 
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Another dean said: 
Now the other thing I’ve heard – and I’ve heard this only as rumor, but I think 
it’s true – that our Dean this year hired a statistician from the business school 
to help us better game the USN and he’s obviously not talking about that. 
That’s a pretty disgusting use of university resources. 
When asked about gaming strategy, someone who had been dean at four differ-
ent law schools spanning three tiers put it this way: 
I think it’s awful. I think the inducement to act dishonorably is not good. We 
are supposed to be teaching people about an honorable profession. We are 
what we are – that’s what I say to people here – the school is what it is and it 
took 115 years to be what we are and if we want to be something different – 
being something different isn’t being higher ranked, it’s about the actual out-
comes. And I think we’ve lost sight of a lot of what’s professional. 
Similar views came up often: 
I’ve heard of some stuff that I think is really, really underhanded, especially in 
the admissions area. If we can’t be ethical when we get these kids in the door, 
how can we possibly give them an education in which we preach that ethics 
are important? What you do preaches a lot louder than what you say. 
[Rankings] create a lot of day-to-day anxiety. The most important thing is the 
ability to develop better resources for the students. And it’s shameful that we 
can’t do what we’re hired to do. 
Disgusting, awful, dishonorable, underhanded, shameful – this is strong lan-
guage that reveals the depth of people’s feelings about rankings. It was enlight-
ening to witness how quickly an interview summoned such strong reactions. 
3.4  Cynicism 
Scholars disagree about how to define emotion and how many emotions there 
are. Some restrict the definition to five or six primary emotions such as fear, 
anxiety, joy, envy, disgust, or shame. It may be that cynicism is more accurate-
ly described as an attitude but I prefer to include it in my more expansive defi-
nition. Cynicism is generally understood as distrusting the motives of others 
and resulting in a sense of detachment from some aspect of social life. For 
Georg Simmel, cynicism is closely associated with what he describes as a 
“blasé attitude.” He sees both cynicism and feeling blasé as effects of the pace 
of modern life and being closely linked the modern money economy where 
values and interactions come to be seen as transactions. 
Rankings are, quite literally, the commodification of reputation and they ac-
centuate the force of market logic in understanding education. Applicants now 
talk quite explicitly of the trade-off between (scholarship) money and the status 
of one’s school. Administrators talk about “buying” high test scores with schol-
arships. And when the editors at USN launched rankings they framed them as 
consumer information so people could know what they were buying. Those in-
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terviewed described with contempt people who “sold out” for rankings. While it 
is not possible to pin down how much the further infusion of market values 
shapes people’s emotional responses, it is clear that efforts to game rankings 
produce a form of fatalistic detachment from the process that makes it easy to 
comment wryly on how corrupt the system is while remaining passive. This 
reaction often took the form of an ironic, detached, scornfulness. It is common for 
people to feel that corruption is rampant under the rankings regime, that col-
leagues cannot be trusted, and that there is no way to control rankings. As one 
faculty member commented wryly, “the most innovative thing about law 
schools now was the invention of new gaming techniques.” Cynicism produces 
a passivity, a paralysis that offers the superficial comfort feeling superior to 
those understand less and so attempt change. It is an excuse for not acting. 
3.5  Happiness 
Of course not all of the emotions evoked by rakings are unhappy ones. When a 
school moves up in the rankings, when administrators receives bonuses, when 
deans are praised, and when alumni send in more checks, these are occasions 
for celebration and pleasure. As Austin Parrish, dean of Indiana’s Maurer 
School of Law put it: “As much as deans rail against [the rankings] they cele-
brate pretty hard when they move up” (Odendahl 2014). Whether with cham-
pagne or pizza, bonuses or raises, ‘good news’ is broadly shared with prospec-
tive students, alumni, and others. The response of Tom Campbell, dean of 
Chapman University’s law school, which moved up 13 slots to 127 in the 2015 
rankings, is typical of schools receiving good news: 
I could not be more pleased to see Chapman University’s Fowler School of 
Law making a solid move up the rankings; but I am not surprised. In a climate 
where students have been more selective in making the decision to pursue a 
career in law, we continue to attract top candidates with excellent credentials. 
Our renewed rise in the U.S. News’ Top Schools list can be attributed in large 
part to the strength of those students, along with our early adoption of a pow-
erful practice-ready curricula and a world-class faculty that includes four for-
mer U.S. Supreme Court clerks and a Nobel laureate.7 
But the pleasure associated with a move up is always tinged with worry about 
falling back down. As one dean relayed: “We get excited for about 5 minutes 
and then we start to worry again.” This view was reiterated by others: 
I think everybody is aware of [rankings]. When we went from the third tier to 
the fourth tier, there was despondency, and when we went from the fourth 
back to the third there was euphoria. And I think the rankings are remarkably 
important, much too important. 
                                                             
7  March 10, 2015 <https://blogs.chapman.edu/law/2015/03/10/chapman-universitys-fowler-
school-of-law-moves-up-in-new-u-s-news-rankings>. 
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I noticed one year [when we] moved into the top tier. There was this sort of 
internal gratitude and elation. People were really happy and there was a lot of 
politicking, and we put a lot of effort into specifically increasing our rank 
[…]. But then we fell back out again. 
One dean of an elite school seemed less concerned about volatility during an 
interview: “I think students are very smart, most people we deal with are very 
smart. As far as trustees go, if we do well we celebrate and if we do poorly, we 
don’t burn down the house.” But faculty who taught at this school reported that 
this dean was “obsessed by rankings” and when this school moved down, even 
one or two positions, “he went crazy trying to figure out how to fix it.” 
3.6  Competition, Suspicion, and Seduction 
Anxiety, anger, embracement, shame, cynicism, and happiness are just some of 
the more common emotions that rankings elicit. It is helpful to consider in 
more detail some of the interactive processes that help promote these feelings. 
Here I identify three: competition, suspicion, and seduction. 
Law schools have always competed against each other over their reputation-
al standing, the best faculty and students, the prestige of their students’ jobs, or 
for the most celebrated alumni. But rankings have escalated and transformed 
the competition among law schools. One way it did so was by eliminating 
useful ambiguity. If, before rankings, the stature of schools like Harvard, Yale, 
and Stanford were securely elite, there was uncertainty about how other less 
famous schools fared. Depending on which characteristics one cared about, 
many schools could make believable claims being highly ranked. After rank-
ings there was no longer ambiguity about which schools were among the top 
ten or the top twenty five. One administrator put it like this: 
[Rankings were] a huge change. I mean, it’s kind of a standard line that there 
are 50 schools in any discipline think that they’re in the top 20. In the old days 
it was very easy to convince yourself that that was true because there was 
nothing out there to show otherwise. And when there were these various, not 
very influential rankings, they were easy to ignore. But USN is so pervasive 
and it has the aura of objectivity. 
Competing over rankings has become the norm. This emerged when people 
talked about how rankings came up in discussions at faculty meetings, with 
colleagues at professional meetings, or in hallway conversations. Administra-
tors also talked about how competition shapes those in charge of producing the 
statistics that USN uses. 
[Staff] do get very competitive, especially with things like the faculty-student 
ratio. Maybe told you about this, but we were trying to figure out how to get 
our faculty-student ration to get better without falsifying anything. So went to 
the seminar that the ABA put on about the report, and there are so many clas-
sifications.” 
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An associate dean talked about the practice of filling out reputational surveys 
strategically: “And then you can’t tell me people vote without thinking about 
who they are voting for in terms of their competition. It’s bogus.” 
Law professors also described how opportunities to publish are shaped by 
rankings. U.S. law schools publish journals called law reviews that are edited 
by their students. The status of these journals often map the status of the law 
schools that produce. Because scholars can submit the same article to as many 
law reviews as they like, the journals are inundated with manuscripts. Profes-
sors believe that student editors use rankings as a proxy for the quality of an 
article. One professor reported: 
Students who work on the law reviews pay attention to that ranking process, 
so even though you have some sort of great paper, if you are coming from a 
school that doesn’t have a good ranking the competition is much more stiff. 
They look at where it comes from; it’s not blind at all. Relentless competition 
is exhausting and some schools give up. Recognizing the uneven playing field 
that makes it impossible for them to be more successful, or refusing to adjust 
their goals to comply better with rankings criteria, some unhappily accept 
their more or less permanent inferior status. For others, the churning that ac-
companies rankings may generate shorter appointments, whether from stress 
or dismissal. Rankings turned inchoate competition into precise, public and 
hard to control numbers, which is a recipe for anxiety. Rankings generate sus-
picion that colleagues cannot be trusted to behave ethically. This suspicion, in 
turn, increases anxiety and competition. 
As three administrators relayed: 
I think that some deans have been forced into mendacity. But they’re probably 
people who had flawed characters to begin. It wasn’t the rankings that did 
that. It’s one of the sad facts of our society, that that kind of thing can be re-
warded in some contexts. I think that the nature of being a dean has changed 
dramatically over the last 10 or 15 years, but only one small reason for that the 
rankings. 
I will look at the rankings each year and I will look particularly at the place-
ment part of the ranking. And if you do this long, you sort of get a sense of 
where people stand with their statistics and I’m always a little amazed, or at 
least curious, because there are some institutions that are putting out numbers 
that for the life of me do not jibe with what I know is reality. 
There is lying that goes on. Basically on the LSAT scores and the GPA scores 
of students. And it’s tragic that people who get into education who are pre-
sumably there to pursue some vision of truth. And I know of at least several 
instances, I know for a fact that people in the face of this pressure to do well 
in the rankings, exaggerated or out-and-out lied. 
Suspicion encourages more gaming which also encourages people to adapt 
cynical attitudes about legal education. 
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In spite or maybe because of the hostility many feel towards ranking there is 
still ambivalence and this often takes shape as seduction.8 To withhold affec-
tion and then succumb is a familiar pattern in courtship but it has parallels with 
metrics. Efforts to game rankings create an emotional investment in “winning,” 
one that is largely unconscious, at least at first. There is the satisfaction of 
feeling clever, of “outsmarting” something odious, and of trying to reassert 
one’s agency in the face of uncertainty and the loss of control. A new dean 
reported: 
I actually found myself this year, for the first time, looking at what are the el-
ements of faculty resources […] because most of those numbers now USN 
takes out of the ABA [American Bar Association] questionnaire that law 
schools have to file every year. And I actually sat down and quizzed the per-
son who is primarily responsible for doing that document about how they do 
it. For example, we do have one endowed fund that lets us bring a visiting pro-
fessor every year, and we usually aim very high in terms of the kinds of peo-
ple, so we pay that person probably as much for a semester almost as we pay 
some of our faculty for a year. And I actually found myself saying, ‘Louise, 
now when we do the instructional budget, we do include money from the en-
dowment that goes to instruction, right?’ Because I just am finding myself 
thinking that we have never thought about the elements of it in terms of USN 
[rankings] and I realized that, ‘Oh God, I’m getting the disease’ (quoted in 
Sauder and Espeland 2009). 
Emotions, even negative ones, can be vehicles of investments. They energize, 
focus attention, evoke interpretations, and prompt action. They also become a 
means by which we internalize rankings. In doing so, they create relationships 
with rankings that members use make sense of the organization and its mem-
bers in particular ways. 
The power of collectivities to inspire and direct passion is a crucial insight 
in sociology. Returning to Collins, it is important to consider how specific 
contexts shape emotional responses to rankings. As we know, simultaneity is 
an important component of ritual, one that heightens emotional response. That 
USN rankings are released all at once at the same time each year means that 
schools’ attentions are all focused on rankings at the same time. That rankings 
become the subjects of lots of articles and posts only heightens their salience 
and the emotions they generate. 
Moreover, when a school dips in the rankings, administrators swing into ac-
tion to try and mollify the anxiety this provokes. Typically, deans will hold a 
“town meeting” for students to explain the drop, reassure the students that it is 
                                                             
8  Eve Chiapello and Norman Fairclough (2002) use the concept of “stimulation” to depict a 
feature of the “new spirit of capitalism” that “generates enthusiasm.” While this is similar to 
my conception of “allure” it differs in my emphasis on its focus on gaming as the primary 
mechanism of seduction. See also Boltanski and Chiapello (2007). See Sauder and Espeland 
(2009) for a description of the allure of rankings. 
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a meaningless blip, and explain what they are going to do about it. Whether 
rankings move up or down, whether they engender celebrations or public ther-
apy, they elicit lots of “we” talk that reinforces members’ ties to one another. 
Schools may hang banners announcing an improved rank, print tee-shirt or 
coffee mugs that make tangible this new status. All of these actions heighten 
emotions. 
I have argued that it is important to specify the causal mechanisms that pro-
pel the organizational changes that performance measures produce. I selected 
two kinds of mechanisms that demonstrate the importance of both highly stra-
tegic responses to such numbers and less deliberate responses. While reverse 
engineering and emotional attachments can be independent causal processes, it 
is important to consider how these interact. In some cases, one mechanism 
produces the other. For example, reverse engineering a ranking may produce a 
cynical response to the power of rankings as members come to see the number 
as something to be manipulated rather than as a goal to achieve. The opposite 
might also be true, too, as cynicism about rankings prompts members to decon-
struct them in order to manipulate them; their illegitimacy makes crass manipu-
lation seem appropriate. Anxiety is also a powerful impetus for reverse engi-
neering. And in the case of rankings, emotions seemed to play less of a role in 
particular decisions and were most important in the more general processes of 
helping people understand what was happening to them and their organization. 
While I have relied mostly on rankings to illustrate the role played by emo-
tions and reverse engineering in prompting changes such as organizations to 
change routines, budgets or recruitment, these mechanisms are widespread. 
One famous example of reverse engineering took place in 1982 when the Man-
ville Corporation declared bankruptcy.9 The Manville Corporation had made a 
fortune in mining asbestos since its founding in the 1860s. Its bankruptcy filing 
was puzzling, given that at the end of 1981 the company reported almost $2 
billion in revenues, was listed at 182 in the Fortune 500, was part of the 30 
Dow Jones companies, and had an A3 debt rating (Delaney 1989, 650). The 
reason for this “strategic bankruptcy” was a series of lawsuits. The first time 
there was evidence suggesting a link between asbestos and the pernicious can-
cer mesothelioma was in 1906. But it was not until the 1970s when thousands 
of victims first began suing the company. The company was well insured, had 
more than 2 billion in assets and fought the litigation vigorously. It also took 
out full page ads in the New York Times and Washington Post declaring that 
“Nothing is wrong with our businesses.” So what changed in less than one 
year? 
Manville’s annual report in 1981 stated it was good financial state but its ac-
counting firm, Cooper and Lybrand, did add a qualifying footnote, acknowl-
                                                             
9  Details about this case come from Delaney (1989). 
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edging the litigation but stating that the firm’s liability was impossible to calcu-
late. In 1982, a new CEO and a new accounting firm, Price Waterhouse, found 
that the liability from litigation was calculable and this made it possible for the 
firm to file for bankruptcy. The firm had commissioned an epidemiological 
study of potential liability produced an estimate but one that it acknowledged 
could be half as large or twice as big. Yet, this number along with flexibly in 
calculating when liability damages would be awarded permitted the company 
to completely alter its financial outlook. In this case, outside expertise was used 
to produce the requisite financial profile that permitted the firm, under pressure 
from its insurers and creditors, to declare bankruptcy, restructure its organiza-
tion and avoid millions of dollars of liability. 
More often, reverse engineering is directed toward boosting numbers. The 
conglomerate era of the 1960s largely revolved around companies using mer-
gers to sustain the high price/earnings ratios that were attracting investors. The 
price earnings ratio is used to evaluate the market value of a stock by the mar-
ket price per share to the earnings per share. Anytime a firm buys another firm 
that has a lower P/E ratio, it improves the buyer’s ratio. Another common way 
to manipulate P/E ratios is for firms to buy back their own stock, which reduces 
the denominator of the ratio. Investors often rewarded improvements in P/E 
ratio with increased prices of shares. Both strategies fueled mergers in the 
1960s, as well as subsequent merger movements. 
Metrics were central feature of change and control in Stalin’s efforts to in-
dustrialize the Soviet Union. His infamous Five Year Plans launched in 1928, 
1932, and 1937 included exhaustive and sometimes unrealistic production 
targets for industries, factories, shifts, managers, and individual workers. Harri-
son (2010) describes the production system as “target-driven culture” in which 
the Politburo fixed priorities that were turned by planners at the ministerial or 
regional level into production quotas or “plans.” Under Stalin, those who did 
not meet goals were punished, often severely, and managers would manipulate 
numbers to meet targets. Even in less draconian times, the rewards and reputa-
tions of most official and managers, according to Harrison, were determined by 
how well they met these plans. The systematic manipulation of these numbers 
was referred to as “pripiski,” a term that was used beginning in the 1930s and 
was common throughout the Soviet era; the verb for adding on was pripisyvat’ 
and the noun for what was added on was pripsika. If small manipulations of 
numbers was commonplace, big manipulations was dangerous and uncommon. 
Emotional attachments can also be formed with unlikely numbers. As the 
sociologist Martin de Santos (2009) shows, Argentina, in 2001, became ob-
sessed with an unlikely object, the country risk indicator known as “riesgo 
pais.” This indicator, more formally known as Emerging Markets Bond Index 
(EMBI), is a benchmark produced by the investment bank Morgan Stanley to 
help investors gauge how the risk associated with the bonds of a particular 
country. It is a daily comparison of the interest rates between what is consid-
HSR 41 (2016) 2  │  301 
ered to be the safest bonds, the U.S. Treasury bonds, and three bond indices of 
a given country’s bonds. Beginning in 1998, Argentina experienced a painful 
depression that shrunk the economy, destroyed jobs, created frightening infla-
tion, eventually toppling the government. 
The country risk factor saw a huge jump during 2001. The jargon, normally 
restricted to finance professionals, became the topic of daily conversations of 
housewives and cab drivers, was an almost daily news feature in local and 
national media, and became what de Santo calls “powerful collective represen-
tation” that shaped how Argentines understood not only their economy but 
their country and its place in the world. It was the subject of nearly daily cover-
age in the newspapers and Argentina’s most prominent newspaper, Clarin, ran 
front page stories about the country risk indicator 4-6 times a month. A key 
part of Argentina’s national identity is that it is a modern “European” country 
in Latin America. The economic boom during the 1990s gave rise to a self-
consciousness of becoming a first world nation. This view of itself was hard to 
reconcile when its economy was rated as riskier than some of the poorest Afri-
can countries. This indicator, which contradicted Argentines’ understandings of 
themselves, evoked shame, anger, anxiety, as well as satire and humor. De 
Santos (2009) conceptualizes numbers that are simultaneously facts about the 
world and symbols of community “fact-totem” in order to highlight the im-
portance of this dual quality. 
As these examples show, the mechanisms of reverse engineering and emo-
tional attachment can help us understand the effects of a variety of numbers 
that both represent and intervene in what they measure. These examples show 
broad reactions that people sometimes have in relation to numbers that affect 
them: they can become strategic goals, encouraging an instrumental manipula-
tion of their components; they can become evocative symbols of self and com-
munity; and they can become both at once. These mechanisms can operate in 
many different conditions that will be amplify or diminish their power. Num-
bers that affect resources or reputations, or become symbolically attached to 
groups, or are widely disseminated will be more prone to these orientations. 
Ratings, which pit individuals, organizations or countries against one another 
often may be more subject to reverse engineering. By considering in careful 
empirical analyses how mechanisms such as these drive changes in organiza-
tions and communities we can better understand the impact of the numbers that 
organize our lives. 
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